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n the past couple of years, several 
investigations by the Ofﬁ  ce of 
the Inspector General (OIG) of 
the US Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS) have drawn 
attention to the use of recruitment 
incentives in research. In 2003, 
Toronto’s   Globe and Mail   reported that 
the pharmaceutical company Biovail 
became the subject of an investigation 
because it paid $1,000 per patient to 
American physicians who managed 
to renew prescriptions of its new 
drug Cardizem LA for at least 11 
patients. The company argued that 
the payments were a reward for data 
gathering for post-marketing research 
[1]. Less successful physicians received 
only $250 per patient. In 2005, the 
OIG started an inquiry into payments 
made by Advanced Neuromodulation 
Systems to physicians who implanted 
a pain-management device in their 
patients for a ﬁ  ve-day trial [2]. 
According to the   Wall Street Journal  , 
those who managed to implant the 
device in at least ﬁ  ve of their patients 
received $1,000 for “data collection 
and management of the trial process.”
    Although the OIG has not yet 
released results of either investigation, 
it previously documented in 2000 
other examples of troubling practices 
in a special report on the use of 
recruitment incentives [3]. Among 
them were an Internet advertisement 
by a family medical practice, 
highlighting their ability to quickly 
recruit patients for drug trials and 
post-marketing studies using two full-
time research coordinators and their 
computerized patient database; and an 
industry article on recruiting patients 
into studies, recommending that 
researchers secure “an endorsement by 
your well-respected newspaper reporter 
or TV news anchor” to generate “more 
phone calls needed to ﬁ  ll studies.”
    These examples have to be 
understood in the context of the 
pervasive commercialization of medical 
research. General concerns relating 
to commercialization have received 
considerable attention. The practice 
of paying research participants has 
also been extensively debated [4–8] 
but remains inadequately regulated 
[9]. Much less attention has been 
paid, however, to issues surrounding 
“ﬁ  nder’s fees” and other recruitment 
incentives issued to physicians for 
successfully referring patients to clinical 
trials investigators. This article aims to 
partly ﬁ  ll this void. 
    Recruitment Incentives in Context
    The increasing prevalence of 
recruitment incentives is directly 
related to growing competition 
between research sponsors. More 
pharmaceutical clinical trials are being 
undertaken than ever before. US 
statistics indicate industry investment 
of increasing magnitude in clinical 
trials. As of 1999, more than 450 
heart, cancer, and stroke drugs were 
under development in the US, and a 
further 191 were under development 
for Alzheimer disease, arthritis, and 
depression [10]. Pre-clinical trials are 
also on the rise. In 1998, there were 
3,278 drugs in pre-clinical testing in 
the US, an increase of 26.8% from 
1995 [3].
    Similar trends are evident elsewhere. 
Health Canada has indicated that it 
reviewed “over 800” applications for 
approval to proceed with clinical trials 
in 1998, and that it has witnessed an 
average 20% annual increase in clinical 
trials conducted in Canada [11]. These 
trends partly explain heightened 
demand for research participants. 
Another contributing factor is the 
trend toward larger trials. According to 
the OIG, clinical trials supporting new 
drug approval applications averaged 
4,237 participants in 1995, an increase 
of 2,916 in one decade [3].
    Speed of testing is as crucial as 
recruiting sufﬁ  cient numbers of 
patients. Thomas Bodenheimer 
mentions, without providing a source, 
that a single day’s delay in getting 
a drug to market costs $1.3 million 
[12]. Claims associated with costs 
of drug development merit careful 
scrutiny since they are often used 
as a rhetorical tool to argue for 
faster approval times or to justify 
the high price of pharmaceuticals. 
However, it is fair to presume that 
delays have ﬁ  nancial repercussions. 
At a 2003 conference, Neil Maresky, 
vice president of scientiﬁ  c affairs at 
Wyeth, stated that problems in patient 
recruitment are “the biggest delaying 
factor in clinical trials” [14]. Patient 
recruitment is thus a crucial challenge, 
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one that industry is attempting to 
address through use of ﬁ  nancial 
incentives. 
  Payments  to  Health-Care 
Professionals
    Industry research sponsors are 
increasingly paying ﬁ  nder’s fees to 
health-care professionals to encourage 
them to recruit patients. Finder’s 
fees can be deﬁ  ned as payments to 
physicians, nurses, or other health-
care professionals for the mere 
recruitment of research participants. 
Reports suggest ﬁ  nder’s fees ranging 
between $2,000 and $5,000 per patient 
are common [15], although it is not 
always easy to distinguish the reward 
for the recruitment of patients from 
remuneration for clinical activities that 
are part of the research. 
    These incentives may partly 
explain the increasing involvement of 
community-based physicians in clinical 
research. Between 1988 and 1998, the 
number of community-based physicians 
participating in research in the US 
increased by 60% [16]. Sponsors target 
community-based physicians because 
their patient bases are seen as an 
untapped reserve of potential research 
participants. Academic researchers, 
in turn, now feel they must compete 
with community-based physicians for 
recruitment incentives, either for 
personal gain or to pay researchers’ 
salaries. 
    Direct payments to researchers, 
often with bonuses for fast recruitment, 
are not the only tools of the trade. 
Sponsors may offer other incentives, 
including authorship priority, paid 
consulting work, and further research 
sponsorship [12,17]. For this reason, 
we use the wider term “recruitment 
incentive” rather than “ﬁ  nder’s fee” 
to discuss the general ethical and 
legal issues associated with various 
practices used to entice physicians into 
recruiting patients. 
    Concerns Raised by Recruitment 
Incentives
      Interference with physicians’ 
judgment.   A general concern is that 
recruitment incentives will encourage 
physicians to act contrary to their 
ﬁ  duciary obligations to their patients. 
The prospect of considerable fees 
for referrals may interfere with the 
judgment of physicians trusted by 
patients to act in their best interests. 
A related concern is potential 
interference with consent processes. 
Fraudulent behavior can be dealt with 
under criminal law [18]. But other 
forms of inﬂ  uence are likely to be more 
subtle and therefore harder to control. 
Researchers who know that enrollment 
of an additional patient will bring a 
$20,000 bonus may be tempted to ﬁ  nd 
a way to convince that patient of the 
“advantages” of participation. 
      Patient safety.   Safety is another 
important concern: ﬁ  nancial interests 
associated with the recruitment of 
patients may encourage researchers 
to disrespect inclusion and exclusion 
criteria, putting patients at risk. 
Misconduct at a VA (Veterans Affairs) 
hospital in Albany, New York, highlights 
this concern [19,20]. Federal ofﬁ  cials 
launched a criminal investigation 
against two researchers involved in a 
cancer study at the hospital in which 
at least ﬁ  ve patients died [21,22]. An 
inspection report by the US Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) concluded 
that patients’ medical records were 
altered in at least ﬁ  ve experimental drug 
studies, enabling veterans to be enrolled 
in studies for which they were either 
too sick or too healthy to qualify [23]. 
The hospital reportedly received a fee 
of $5,000 for each patient enrolled [23], 
and some individual investigators are 
reported to have received undisclosed 
recruitment incentives [19]. The junior 
researcher pled guilty to criminally 
negligent homicide as well as fraud 
and was sentenced to six years in 
prison [24]. The senior researcher was 
not charged, but the FDA initiated 
disqualiﬁ  cation proceedings against 
him on September 22, 2004 [25]. As 
of June 5, 2006, the case was still open 
(conﬁ  rmed in a phone call to the FDA’s 
Division of Scientiﬁ  c Investigations 
on June 5, 2006). Safety concerns may 
be ampliﬁ  ed with the involvement 
of community-based physicians, who 
may lack experience in research, who 
may be overburdened, and who work 
more in isolation, perhaps making it 
harder to critically evaluate and discuss 
research beneﬁ  ts and risks with other 
professionals. 
      Erosion of public trust in clinical 
research.   More general concerns 
relate to the public interest in clinical 
science. In a competitive environment, 
commercial sponsors enjoy signiﬁ  cant 
control over research. Careful selection 
of patients and development of 
research methodology, combined 
with selective publication, may lead 
to the approval of minimally effective 
and potentially harmful drugs. A 
host of recent controversies indicate 
how pharmaceutical sponsors have 
engaged in the selective publication of 
results, the manipulation of data, the 
use of ghost authors, and, allegedly, 
the fraudulent promotion of off-
label prescription, on the basis of 
questionable research [26]. Erosion 
of scientiﬁ  c integrity risks the health 
of future patients and places undue 
burden on publicly funded health 
care. Further, recruitment incentives 
are implicated in the distortion of 
research agendas and priorities [27]. 
Researchers who conduct publicly 
funded research may encounter 
difﬁ  culties recruiting patients 
because they cannot offer signiﬁ  cant 
recruitment incentives. As a result, 
valuable research may be neglected for 
research of sometimes questionable 
scientiﬁ  c importance and clinical value.
    Existing Controls on Recruitment 
Incentives
    Few would argue that patients in trials 
should be treated as commodities, but 
patients have become de facto market 
products, while “market controls” are 
neither clear nor sufﬁ  ciently stringent.
    Various organizations have taken 
a stand against certain recruitment 
practices. The American Medical 
Association’s Council on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs stated unequivocally in 
one opinion that “offering or accepting 
payment for referring patients to 
research studies (ﬁ  nder’s fees) is 
unethical” [28]. In a report on ﬁ  nder’s 
fees, the council clariﬁ  es the basis 
for its recommendation, and seems 
to widen its ambit. It states that “any 
kind of compensation in return for the 
referral of patients” is unethical [29]. 
An earlier general opinion on conﬂ  icts 
of interest indicates, however, that 
remuneration that is “commensurate 
with the efforts of the researcher on 
behalf of the company” is acceptable 
[30].
    The Canadian Medical Association 
has issued a statement on relations 
with the pharmaceutical industry that 
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refers to ﬁ  nder’s fees [31]. But it fails 
to clearly prohibit them or to mandate 
their disclosure, and essentially diverts 
the issue to institutional review boards 
(IRBs). Several academic institutions 
offer more direct guidance, expressly 
prohibiting ﬁ  nder’s fees [32–37]. But 
since most clinical drug trials now take 
place outside of academic institutions, 
such guidance has little impact on the 
practice. It is also not clear whether 
academic institutions have thorough 
control over the research practices in 
their institutions, even when they have 
such policies in place.
    Physicians should, however, be 
aware that legal and regulatory 
sanctions may be imposed on them 
for accepting recruitment incentives. 
Signiﬁ  cant private liability may arise. 
If physicians purposefully misinform 
or fail to adequately inform patients of 
their ﬁ  nancial interests, they expose 
themselves to tort liability for battery 
or negligence.   Moore v. Regents of the 
University of California   [38] suggests that 
non-disclosure of ﬁ  nancial interests 
by a physician can give rise to a cause 
of action for breach of ﬁ  duciary duty, 
although a more recent Florida District 
Court rejected the argument that 
physicians have to disclose ﬁ  nancial 
interests [39].
    Other serious legal consequences, 
including criminal charges, are also 
possible [40]. Most US states [41] and 
some Canadian provinces [42] have 
statutory frameworks on professional 
misconduct, with provisions that could 
apply to research activities. The US 
federal “anti-kickback statute” also 
makes it a felony to induce referral of 
patients covered by federal health-care 
programs [43]. These statutes generally 
prohibit the offer or acceptance 
of rewards for referring patients to 
health-care providers or facilities. The 
general terms in which such statutory 
provisions are constructed suggests 
that they could readily be applied 
to sanction the offer or receipt of a 
broad range of recruitment incentives 
used in clinical research [40]. The 
  California Business and Professions Code  , 
for example, prohibits the “receipt, 
or acceptance…of any rebate, refund, 
commission…or other consideration…
as compensation or inducement for 
referring patients, clients, or customers 
to any person” [44].
    In the US, regulatory authorities 
have also laid charges under the 
federal False Claims Act in cases 
where ﬁ  nancial interests were not 
disclosed to granting agencies, and 
where researchers violated regulations, 
compliance with which was a condition 
for funding [45]. In Canada, 
signiﬁ  cant case law has expanded 
the potential scope of application 
of general Criminal Code fraud 
provisions [46]. Canadian physicians 
who fail to disclose ﬁ  nancial interests 
in referrals or other forms of advice to 
patients expose themselves to possible 
criminal prosecution for fraud, and 
when the patient’s treatment suffers as 
a result [40].
  Recruitment  Incentives  and 
Regulatory Reform 
    The problems raised by ﬁ  nder’s 
fees cannot be resolved by focusing 
exclusively on sanctioning the 
individuals who may accept them. 
They ought to be addressed as part of 
a broader institutional and regulatory 
reform effort designed to address 
weaknesses in research governance.
    Such reforms ought to include 
speciﬁ  c institutional and regulatory 
guidance on broad conﬂ  ict-of-
interest issues. Strict but narrow rules 
on ﬁ  nder’s fees may fail to protect 
participants from the inﬂ  uence 
of conﬂ  icts arising from other 
arrangements that are harder to detect 
and control. Several organizations 
have come up with sensible 
recommendations to strengthen 
conﬂ  ict-of-interest rules. A task force of 
the Association of American Medical 
Colleges issued two important reports 
on investigator [47] and institutional 
[48] conﬂ  icts of interest. The task force 
strongly recommends that institutions 
separate the ﬁ  nancial management 
of research from their conduct and 
oversight, and, further, that they 
establish independent conﬂ  ict-of-
interest committees. With regard 
to individuals, it recommends that 
institutions introduce a rebuttable 
presumption that individuals holding a 
signiﬁ  cant ﬁ  nancial interest in a study 
may not participate in its conduct. 
    The DHHS has also recommended 
the establishment of specialized 
institutional conﬂ  ict-of-interest 
committees in a guidance document: 
“Financial Relationships and Interests 
in Research Involving Human Subjects” 
[49]. If the recommendations of the 
Association of American Medical 
Colleges and the DHHS are acted 
upon, they may go a long way to 
address concerns about conﬂ  icts of 
interest within academic institutions. 
However, it is unlikely that the 
adoption and enforcement of more 
stringent institutional policies will 
alone satisfactorily address concerns 
generated by recruitment incentives. 
    Regulatory agencies and institutions 
rely too much on IRBs to evaluate and 
control conﬂ  icts of interest. While the 
development of specialized conﬂ  ict-of-
interest committees within academic 
institutions would add a layer of 
more focused protection, IRBs would 
presumably still play the central role in 
protecting research participants from 
the ill effects of conﬂ  icts of interest. 
Unfortunately, while IRB review can 
deal with small-scale, speciﬁ  c conﬂ  ict-
of-interest issues, IRBs themselves are 
currently neither sufﬁ  ciently regulated 
nor independent to fulﬁ  ll their 
important function. 
    Various reports clearly indicate 
that the IRB system is currently facing 
considerable challenges [50–52]. One 
of the core problems with regard to 
IRB review of conﬂ  icts of interest 
is the signiﬁ  cant conﬂ  icts faced by 
IRBs themselves. While IRBs have 
an important public-policy mandate 
(protection of human research 
participants), they are deﬁ  cient with 
respect to some basic principles of 
administrative law [53]. Academic 
IRBs often lack independence or suffer 
the perception of bias because of the 
interests of their host institutions in the 
approval of research. The increasing 
reliance of academic institutions on 
private sponsors augments concerns 
about direct or indirect institutional 
pressure on IRBs. Many contract 
research organizations have set up 
internal IRBs, which suffer from similar 
conﬂ  icts of interest. Further, for most 
clinical trials involving community-
based physicians, commercial IRBs 
are employed. The legitimacy of 
the review provided by these IRBs is 
undermined by an inherent conﬂ  ict 
of interest, given that they are paid to 
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make a decision that has an immediate 
impact on the ﬁ  nancial interests of 
their clients [53,54]. Improvement of 
the IRB system, for example through 
the establishment of IRBs with a strong 
governmentally controlled mandate 
and exclusive jurisdiction [53], is 
a logical ﬁ  rst step in dealing with 
problems relating to the increased 
commercialization of medical research. 
    There are, however, other solutions 
that are more radical and simpler. One 
option is to establish an independent 
national institute for drug testing, 
to ensure the reliability of the data 
supporting drug approval [55,56]. 
Drug companies seeking to have a drug 
approved would submit the drug for 
testing to the institute, which would 
then negotiate a research protocol 
with the sponsor. The research would 
be contracted out to a qualiﬁ  ed 
independent drug-assessment center, 
which would negotiate contractual 
terms and matters of data publication 
with the institute. Other proposals 
include the establishment of a three-
pronged independent drug regulatory 
authority that would not only control 
clinical trials and post-marketing 
studies more directly, but also control 
drug promotion and publicity [57].
    Proposals such as these would do 
much to safeguard the independence 
of research. They could also provide 
a check on competition for research 
participants. Strict guidelines on 
recruitment of, and payments to, 
patients could be established for these 
drug assessment centers, and clinical 
trials could be better coordinated. The 
number of industry-driven exploratory 
trials—often aimed at coming up with 
“good data” to support applications 
and marketing—would also likely 
decrease. More rigorous review of 
the merit of trials, and the resulting 
decrease in their number, could also 
help alleviate industry concerns. 
Centralization of patient recruitment 
and reduction in recruitment 
competition might make it easier to 
recruit patients for valuable research, 
thus also reducing pre-approval time 
windows. Since these proposals require 
a thorough overhaul of current 
drug-regulation structures, and 
since they will not occur tomorrow, 
it is important that regulatory and 
professional agencies immediately 
investigate other measures, including 
those recommended above. 
  Conclusion
    We note one problem raised by our 
recommendations. They do not address 
the problem of jurisdiction shopping. 
Strengthened regulatory structures 
in North America have resulted 
in clinical trials being moved even 
more often to middle- or low-income 
countries, where recruitment and other 
research-related costs are cheaper, 
where regulations either do not exist 
or may not be adequately enforced, 
and where research participants are 
even more vulnerable [58]. These 
developments are a real cause for 
concern. Our recommendations for a 
more stringent regulatory review in the 
North American context will hopefully 
inspire others to look at strengthening 
the national regulatory regimes in 
other countries and at developing and 
enforcing international standards for 
recruitment in clinical trials.   
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